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Abstract 
This paper considers, theoretically and empirically, how different organization 
modes are aligned to govern the efficient solving of technological problems. The 
data set is from the Chinese consumer electronics industry. Following the problem 
solving perspective (PSP) within the knowledge-based view (KBV), we develop 
and test several PSP and KBV hypotheses, whilst controlling for some relevant 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and other variables, in an examination of the 
determinants of the firms¶ R&D organization choice. The results show that a firm¶s 
existing knowledge base is the most important explanatory factor. Problem 
complexity and decomposability are also found to be important, but it is suggested, 
contrary to the view of PSP, that they are better treated as separate variables, and 
that equity-based alliances tend to be reserved for the most complex problems. 
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1. Introduction 
The emergence of the problem-solving perspective (PSP) (Macher, 2006; Nickerson 
and Zenger, 2004) within the knowledge-based view (KBV) is a major development in 
the theory of the firm. It seeks to combine transaction cost economics (TCE) 
(Williamson, 1985, 1996), complexity theory (Simon, 1962; Kauffman, 1995) and the 
KBV of the firm (Conner, 1991; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Foss, 1996; Kogut and 
Zander, 1992) to explain how different organization modes are aligned to govern the 
efficient creation of valuable knowledge. In this perspective the firm is a knowledge-
bearing problem solving entity, with the key tasks of management being the 
identification of valuable problems and the organization of solution searches. The firm, 
by organizing problem finding and problem solving efficiently, creates value. 
Although adopting a different unit of analysis than TCE, the PSP applies similarly the 
ORJLF RI µGLVFULPLQDWLQJ DOLJQPHQW¶ :LOOLDPVRQ  LQ HYDOXDWLQJ WKH UHODWLYH
efficiency of different organization modes for organizing problem solving. Based on 
previous work, a few dimensions are identified as being crucial to understanding the 
impediments to problem solving. Furthermore it is contended that, as far as the costs 
and competencies of implementing solution searches for different types of problem are 
concerned, the few generic organization modes differ systematically with respect to 
incentive intensity, communication channels, dispute resolution regimes, etc. Finally, 
the PSP works out the match between problem/knowledge attributes and the few 
generic organization modes in an economizing manner that realizes superior search 
performance. 
As DµQHZ¶perspective, empirical research of the PSP is underdeveloped in that few 
studies (Macher, 2006; Macher and Boerner, 2012) are directly devoted to its empirical 
examination. This paper seeks to address this shortcoming by developing and testing 
some PSP/KBV hypotheses whilst controlling for some relevant TCE and other 
variables LQ DQ H[DPLQDWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V FKRLFH EHWZHHQ LQ-house, equity-based 
alliance, contract-based alliance, and outsourcing as R&D organization mode. The 
multinomial logit model, discussed in section 4, is used to explain the three relative 
probabilities 
 
Pr( )
Pr( - )
option
in house
 (1) 
where µoption¶ is equity-based alliance, contract-based alliance, or outsourcing, using 
a data set collected by survey from the Chinese consumer electronics industry, and more 
fully described in section 3. Following the PSP and the KBV, we use measures of 
problem complexity (intensity of knowledge set interactions, decomposability, and 
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problem structure), and measures of knowledge tacitness and social distribution as 
predictors. In particular, we argue that intensity of knowledge set interactions and 
decomposability are analytically distinguishable. We treat them as two separate 
variables and find that they have significant, and rather different, organizational 
ramifications. Knowledge codifiability and social distribution, by contrast, are only 
marginally significant at best. With reference to other closely related literature, we 
further FRQWHQG WKDW D ILUP¶V H[LVWLQJ NQRZOHGJH EDVH KDV SURIRXQG LPSDFWV RQ WKH
organization of its problem solving but that this dimension has been relatively 
underexplored in the existing PSP literature. We introduce an appropriate measure into 
the analysis and find it to be a significant predictor. A few relevant TCE variables are 
also included as controls and some of them, such as physical asset specificity and 
appropriability, turn out to be significant, although the estimation results are not always 
completely  consistent  with  TCE predictions. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
In the PSP, WKHµSUREOHP¶ is the basic unit of analysis and the profitable discovery of a 
high-value solution for a given problem is the central rationale for the organization 
choice. It is assumed that new knowledge is generated by combining existing 
knowledge, and that a solution to a problem represents a unique combination of existing 
knowledge. For a given problem, the set of all possible combinations of relevant 
knowledge can be presented as a solution landscape, the topography of which defines 
the value of each solution. Accordingly, problem solving can be seen as the search over 
the solution landscape for high value solutions (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). 
Building on SLPRQ¶VZRUNRQcomplexity (1962, 1973), which aims at understanding 
the architecture of complexity and how various organizing principles can be applied to 
cope with complexity given bounded rationality, DQG.RJXWDQG=DQGHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQV
to the KBV of the firm (1988; 1992), which highlight the boundary implications of tacit 
and socially distributed knowledge, certain problem attributes (complexity, 
decomposability, and structure) and knowledge characteristics (tacitness and social 
distribution) are identified as critical dimensions for understanding the coordination and 
incentive challenges to problem solving (Heiman and Nickerson 2002; Macher, 2006; 
Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Moreover, proponents of the PSP (Nickerson et al., 2004) 
endorse the KBV argument that hierarchies enjoy advantages over other organization 
modes, either because they facilitate knowledge exchange via the cultivation of 
organization-specific communication codes, shared language and routines (Grant, 1996; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982), or because they economize on 
knowledge transfer by exercising authority and direction (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; 
Demsetz, 1988). They further propose the µGLVFULPLQDWLQJDOLJQPHQW¶WKDWGHILQHVWKH
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match between problem attributes, knowledge characteristics, and organization modes. 
They argue (Leiblein and Macher, 2009; Macher, 2006; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004) 
that given the above-mentioned advantages, together with the control mechanisms and 
low-powered incentives characteristic of internal organization (Williamson, 1991), 
hierarchies are better able to implement heuristic search through information 
dissemination, consensus building, and authority direction as compared to markets. 
Therefore, hierarchies realize solution search performance advantages for ill-structured, 
complex or non-decomposable problems. By contrast, markets enjoy certain 
advantages arising from more specialized expertise (Hayek, 1945), high-powered 
incentives, decentralized decision making (Williamson, 1991), and more direct 
competitive pressures (D'Aveni et al., 1994), so that markets improve the speed/quality 
of problem solving via directional search when technological development involves 
well-structured, simple or decomposable problems. Adopting Williamson¶s (1991) 
view that collaborative arrangements (alliances) are µhybrid¶ modes of organization 
lying somewhere between market and hierarchy along a hypothetical continuum, in the 
PSP literature, the discriminating alignment has been extended to include the choice of 
collaborative arrangements (alliances) (Leiblein and Macher, 2009) where it is argued 
that alliances (in particular, joint ventures) are better than markets in solving ill-
structured or complex problems, but perhaps not as suitable for the most ill-structured 
or complex problems as hierarchies.   
In the PSP literature, however, the organizational implications of a firm¶s existing 
knowledge base have been relatively underexplored, although recent literature (Macher 
and Boerner, 2012) has begun to address the issue, as anticipated by Nickerson and 
Zenger (2004). By contrast, in the KBV literature (for a review, see Grant, 2003) upon 
which the PSP is grounded, it is firmly held that a firm¶s existing knowledge base has 
profound organizational consequences, and this view has been applied to the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQRIDILUP¶V5	'DFWLYLWLHVHJ=KDQJet al., 2007). Given this, we suggest 
that this dimension is of particular relevance to the organization of problem solving and 
that its role should be highlighted. 
2.1 Complexity (Intensity of Knowledge Set Interactions) and Decomposability 
These two dimensions were introduced to the PSP literature by Nickerson and Zenger 
(2004), with their origins traced back to Simon (1962). Simon argues that complexity 
obtains when a large number of parts making up a system interact in a non-simple way. 
$V D V\VWHP FRPSOH[LW\ IUHTXHQWO\ WDNHV WKH IRUP RI D ³KLHUDUFK\´ consisting of 
interrelated subsystems which, in turn, are hierarchical in nature, until the lowest level 
subsystem is reached. In a hierarchical system, the interactions amongst and within 
subsystems are distinguished, and the distinction between decomposable, non-
decomposable and nearly decomposable systems is made accordingly. In a 
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decomposable (non-decomposable) system, the interactions amongst subsystems are 
negligible (essential); whilst in a nearly decomposable system, the interactions amongst 
the subsystems are weak, but not negligible.  
Based primarily on Simon¶s contributions, the complexity of problems is divided into 
three broad categories (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), depending on the extent to which 
relevant knowledge sets interact to produce a valuable solution (Leiblein and Macher, 
2009).  
For (fully-) decomposable and low-interaction problems, interdependencies amongst 
relevant knowledge sets are negligible and decomposition into sub-problems is easy. 
Solving such problems requires little coordination and knowledge sharing. Local trial-
and-error (directional) search through experiential learning and feedback provides 
certain advantages. Decomposability also implies that the solutions to sub-problems are 
additive (Leiblein and Macher, 2009) as sub-problems can be solved independently and 
simultaneously, with the optimal solutions being readily aggregated to give a globally 
optimal solution for the original problem. 
At the other extreme are non-decomposable and high-interaction problems, for which 
there exist intensive and extensive interactions amongst knowledge sets, with there 
being no practical pattern of decomposability. To solve such problems, 
cognitive/heuristic search is prescribed, calling for problem solvers to collectively 
develop cognitive maps to navigate the search (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Simon, 
1988), necessitating the sharing/exchange of knowledge amongst multiple actors. As 
specialists from different fields are cognitively constrained in their learning capacity 
the task of coordinating and integrating VSHFLDOLVWV¶NQRZOHGJH is demanding (Hsieh et 
al., 2007). Moreover, given self-interestedness, incentive impediments such as 
knowledge appropriation hazards and strategic knowledge accumulation hazards tend 
to complicate the organization of solution discovery (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). 
Between the extremes are nearly-decomposable and moderate-interaction problems, 
for which the knowledge set interactions are moderate. Sub-problems associated with 
distinctive knowledge sets can be identified but non-trivial interdependencies amongst 
the sub-problems remain. Near-decomposability also means that knowledge set 
interactions within sub-problems are greater than amongst sub-problems so that 
solution search requires some knowledge sharing and coordination. Accordingly, the 
aforementioned coordination and incentive challenges still apply, albeit on a reduced 
scale.  
With reference to the NK system (Kauffman, 1993), the complexity of a problem can 
be defined more analytically by N (the number of relevant knowledge sets) and K (the 
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magnitude of interdependence) 1  (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Simple problems 
involve a small number of relevant knowledge sets interacting in more predictable ways, 
mapping into smooth solution landscapes. Complex problems entail a larger number of 
relevant knowledge sets, amongst which there are pervasive interactions and extensive 
connectivity, with the implied solution landscapes tending to be more rugged. As the 
likelihood of conflicting constraints across choices increases with N and K (Kauffman, 
1993) the solving of complex problems requires the balancing of multiple design 
choices, adding to the difficulty of finding the global optima (Jonassen, 2004).  
Notwithstanding the above, it seems to the authors that both Nickerson and Zenger 
(2004) and the wider PSP literature do not particularly differentiate between knowledge 
set interactions and problem decomposability. Theoretically, they are considered as two 
concomitant aspects of problem complexity (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004) and 
empirically they are treated as a single variable (Macher, 2006; Macher and Boerner, 
2012). However, knowledge set interactions and problem decomposability are 
analytically distinguishable and do not always move in the same direction, although 
both are determined jointly by N and K. Specifically, knowledge set interactions capture 
the intensity of interactions whereas decomposability depends on the pattern of such 
interactions (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Simon, 1962). In particular decomposability 
indicates that such interactions tend to cluster tightly into nearly isolated subsets 
(Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004).  
To illustrate the difference, consider the three NK systems in Figure 1. In each case, 
N=6, K=1 and there are 12 interactions amongst the elements. In terms of intensity of 
knowledge set interaction the three systems are equally complex, but they exhibit 
different patterns of decomposability.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
System 1 displays random interactions with no obvious pattern of decomposability, 
whilst systems 2 and 3 can be decomposed into two and three subsystems respectively. 
In terms of non-decomposability, system 1 is more complex than system 2, which is, in 
turn, more complex than system 3.  
                                                 
1
 K is defined as the number each of the N consisting knowledge sets is affected by other knowledge sets 
in the same problem. A problem is of minimum complexity when each knowledge set is independent 
(K=0), and of maximum complexity when each relevant knowledge set is affected by all other knowledge 
sets (K=N-1). 
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Given the above analysis, knowledge set interactions and problem decomposability are 
treated as separate variables in this study and we try to differentiate empirically their 
respective effects on organization choice.  
2.2 Definiteness of Problem Structure 
In complexity theory the definiteness of problem structure has long been recognized as 
a distinct dimension of problem complexity (Simon, 1973). According to Simon, 
virtually all problems are initially ill-structured. They become well-structured as 
problem solvers become increasingly prepared for, and more familiar with, them. Such 
a process of formalization renders problems solvable. Well-structured problems are the 
outcomes of problem defining processes and the accumulation of problem solving 
techniques.  
In the PSP literature, this dimension was introduced by Macher (2006). Building mainly 
on 6LPRQ¶s work, and with reference to the NK system, Macher argues that problems 
can be characterized along a continuum of problem definiteness, ranging from ill-
structured to well-structured. The extent to which a problem is well-structured depends 
on the characteristics of the problem domain, as well as on the clarity of the problem 
solving mechanisms. Ill-structured problems have poorly defined initial states 
(ambiguous N and K) (Jonassen, 2004) and unexpected/unknown knowledge set 
interactions (Fernandes et al., 1999), so that appropriate approaches to problem solving 
are unclear. By contrast, well-structured problems are those with well-defined initial 
states (unambiguous N and K) and well understood knowledge set interactions. 
Accordingly, approaches to problem solving are explicit and well-accepted. 
As these differences also affect problem decomposability (Ethiraj and Levinthal., 2004; 
Levinthal, 1997) a connection between problem structure and decomposability can be 
made (Macher, 2006). Ill-structured problems cannot be decomposed because the 
knowledge set interactions are often unexpected/unknown, making solution search 
difficult. The knowledge set interactions for well-structured problems, though not 
necessarily decomposable, are better understood, implying that solution searches are 
more transparent. 
The definiteness of problem structure has implications for the relative performance of 
different solution search methods. For ill-structured problems, heuristic search realizes 
performance advantages via ex ante cognitive evaluations of the probable consequences 
of particular search decisions, as opposed to ex post reliance on feedback from previous 
trials (Simon, 1991). For well-structured problems, directional search guided by 
feedback or experiential learning is more efficient in achieving high-value solutions 
compared to heuristic search (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Simon, 1973). 
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In summary, in the above two subsections it is argued that coordination and incentive 
challenges to problem solving vary systematically across problem types, with which 
different search methods can be matched in a way that realizes superior search 
performance. Combining insights from both the TCE and the KBV, it is further argued 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2004) that the costs and competencies of implementing 
different search methods differ across the few generic organization modes, so that 
solution search for a particular type of problem can be most efficiently organized by 
some specific mode. In the PSP literature (Macher, 2006; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), 
the discriminating alignment dictates that markets are most suitable when problems are 
simple, decomposable and well-structured. By contrast, hierarchies entail high 
organization costs and should only be adopted when the benefits from building 
consensus or supporting authority direction are high, this being the case when the 
problem is complex, non-decomposable and ill-structured.  
The above discussion implies that, in accordance with the general PSP predictions and 
given that alliances are treated as µK\EULG¶ modes of organization, the variables 
measuring problem complexity (intensity of knowledge set interaction), 
decomposability, and definiteness of problem structure (COM, DEC, PS) will have a 
negative impact on each of the three relative probabilities in equation (1) (See Table 1). 
Hypothesis regarding  COM, DEC, and PS  are presented more fully in section 2.5. 
2.3 A Firm¶s Existing Knowledge Base 
Above, it is noted that the extent to which a problem is well-structured depends on how 
well solvers are prepared for it. It should be emphasized that the idea can in fact be 
operationalized on two different levels, with, in our view, distinct organizational 
consequences. On a collective level, whether a problem is well-structured depends on 
how much human beings as a whole know about the problem, and the extent to which 
they have developed corresponding problem solving techniques. This, as we understand 
it, is what is discussed in the previous section. On an individual level, given the µstate 
of the art¶ for solving a specific problem, whether and how well/fast a problem solver 
is able to find a solution also depends on how well this solver is equipped with relevant 
knowledge. Problem structure is thus solver-dependent, and consequently related to a 
firm¶s existing knowledge base. A given problem can pose radically different 
challenges for different solvers with different knowledge backgrounds, thus leading to 
different organization choices and performances.  
Indeed, Nickerson and Zenger (2004: p. 629) clearly anticipate the need for addressing 
heterogeneous knowledge bases in stating WKDW ³LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH RI SUREOHPV KDV
important implications for governance choice´VRWKDW³>0@angers likely choose new 
SUREOHPV UHIOHFWLQJ XSRQ WKH FRPSRVLWLRQ RI NQRZOHGJH VHWV DOUHDG\ LQ WKH ILUP¶V
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SRVVHVVLRQ´6LPLODUSRLQWVKDYHbeen made more explicitly by Macher and Boerner 
(2012) who contend that firms with more technological knowledge in relevant fields 
can improve performance not only via experiential learning by doing, which tends to 
favour the choice of internal development, but also through better supplier relationship 
management, which instead tends to favour the choice of markets, so that D ILUP¶V
tecKQRORJLFDO NQRZOHGJH EDVH LV ³OLNHO\ WR KDYH RUJDQL]DWLRQ DQG SHUIRUPDQFH
LPSOLFDWLRQV WKDW GHSHQG LQ SDUW RQ WKH VWUXFWXUH RI WHFKQRORJLFDO GHYHORSPHQW´
(Macher and Boerner, 2012: p. 3). In other words, DILUP¶VH[LVWLQJNQRZOHGJH base 
affects the organization and the performance of its technological problem solving, both 
through its independent effect2 and through its interaction effect with the structure of 
the problem. Notwithstanding this, WKH SRVVLEOH OLQNDJH EHWZHHQ D ILUP¶V H[LVWLQJ
knowledge base and its organization choice is still underexplored in the PSP literature. 
By contrast in the KBV (Grant, 2003), the organizational learning (Boerner et al., 2001), 
and the innovation literatures (Teece et al., 2010), DILUP¶VH[LVWLQJNQRZOHGJHEDVHKDV
been found, both theoretically and empirically, to have profound organizational 
consequences. Its implications for the organization of R&D have also been explored 
(e.g., Zhang and Baden-Fuller, 2010; Zhang et al., 2007).  
As also noted by Macher and Boerner (2012), in the KBV literature the firm is 
conceptualized as a routine-based, history-dependent knowledge bearing social entity 
that adapts experimentally and incrementally to its past experiences (Penrose, 1955). In 
this view, the existing knowledge base provides the firm with information filters (Arrow, 
1974), absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), and routines (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982) that facilitate the integration of knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992) 
and improve problem solving efficiency in specific technological areas (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). Accordingly, more experienced/knowledgeable firms achieve superior 
performance in technological development, irrespective of the mode chosen (Macher, 
2006). Moreover, as more experienced/knowledgeable firms enjoy experiential 
learning-by-doing and uncertainty reduction performance advantages, they tend to in-
source technological development (Argote, 1999). More generally, in this literature it 
is firmly held that firms tend to internalize activities in which they have superior 
capabilities and outsource those in which they have inferior capabilities (Argyres, 1996). 
Recent work (Coombs and Metcalfe, 2000; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004) also reveals 
that, in many cases, firms participate in various forms of alliance mainly to access 
                                                 
2
 However the authors state that more experienced firms perform better ERWK³LQGHYHORSLQJ
knowledge within and integrating knowledge across RUJDQL]DWLRQDOERXQGDULHV´ 0DFKHU	
Boerner, 2012: p. 16, emphasis added), so that they have greater organizational flexibility in 
technological development. They appear DJQRVWLFDVWRZKHWKHUDILUP¶VH[LVWLQJNQRZOHGJH
base has an independent impact on its organization choices and tend to believe that such an 
effect is neutral with respect to make-or-buy decisions. 
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external complementary knowledge/capabilities. A link between alliance participation 
and a firm¶s knowledge base can thus be established.  
Applying the above insights in the context of technological problem solving, it can be 
argued that a firm with a higher level of knowledge in relevant fields is more likely to 
organize problem solving in-house rather than through markets, ceteris paribus. 
Similarly, when a firm is trying to solve a complex problem, for which it has 
considerable knowledge but is nevertheless lacking in some critical knowledge 
direction, it would, depending on the attributes of the problem, leverage various forms 
of collaborative arrangement to access external complementary knowledge.  
In short, the above discussion tends to imply that, again in accordance with the general 
PSP/KBV prediction and given that alliances are treated as µK\EULG¶, the variable 
measuring a firm¶s existing knowledge base (EKB) will have a negative impact on each 
of the three relative probabilities in equation (1) (See Table 1). Hypotheses regarding 
EKB are further developed in section 2.5. 
2.4 Knowledge Tacitness and Social Distribution 
In the KBV of the firm tacit, contextually dependent, and socially distributed 
knowledge is of central explanatory importance. In a series of papers (1988; 1992, 1995, 
1996), Kogut and Zander explore the boundary implications of tacit and socially 
distributed knowledge, with further development due to Langlois and others (Hippel, 
1994; Langlois, 1992; Langlois and Foss, 1999). As indicated by Langlois and Foss 
(1999), at the heart of these stories is the argument that productive knowledge is often 
hard to articulate and not possessed by any single mind. Instead, it is distributed across 
a group of interacting agents, emerging from the integration of the tacit knowledge 
elements they possess. Moreover, such knowledge is often contextually sensitive in that 
it can only be mobilized in the firm-specific context of carrying out multi-person tasks. 
When such knowledge is to be transferred between firms, a firm may have difficulty 
understanding the knowledge and capabilities held by another firm, and both firms 
separately and jointly may know more than their contracts can tell (Kogut and Zander 
1992), thus adding to the contractual complications. In this context, the costs of 
negotiating and making contracts with potential partners, of teaching and educating the 
contractual counterparts, etc., become very real factors in shaping the firm boundary 
(Langlois, 1992). Firms tend to internalize the utilization of tacit and socially 
distributed knowledge as internalization economizes on the costs associated with its 
transmission (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Such economization of costs is possible not 
because firms can provide better incentive alignments, but because they can supply a 
set of ³KLJKHU-order organizing principles of how to coordinate groups and transfer 
NQRZOHGJH´ (Kogut & Zander, 1992: p. 389) that markets cannot offer. 
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Apart from the make-or-buy decision, similar reasoning has been applied to alliance 
governance (Kogut, 1988), with subsequent development due to Heiman and Nickerson 
(2002, 2004), who incorporate the logics of the PSP and the TCE. Heiman and 
Nickerson argue that inter-firm collaboration can be understood as a problem solving 
process involving the combining of the distinct knowledge sets of the participants, often 
tacit and socially distributed. Given bounded rationality, such knowledge 
characteristics can interact with problem complexity to pose significant challenges for 
the sharing/transferring of knowledge in the process of joint solution search. To 
overcome these challenges various knowledge management practices, such as high-
bandwidth communication channels and common communication codes, are often 
adopted, which in turn give rise to higher knowledge appropriation hazards via 
increased knowledge transparency. Efficient governance of inter-firm collaboration 
should therefore address the problems of knowledge transfer and knowledge 
expropriation jointly, while an equity-based alliance can deal with both problems more 
effectively than a contract-based alliance. On the one hand, with the aid of the 
hierarchical structure and the concomitant coordination/administrative apparatuses, an 
equity-based alliance is better able to accommodate the afore-mentioned knowledge 
management practices, making it a superior vehicle for transferring/sharing complex 
knowledge. On the other hand, equity-based governance also provides better safeguards 
against misappropriation of knowledge as shared ownership tends to alleviate 
opportunistic incentives, increase monitoring, and enhance managerial controls.  
Given that alliances are treated as µK\EULG¶, the above discussion tends to imply that the 
variables measuring the tacitness (operationalized by the two dimensions of 
codifiability and teachability, see section 3.3) and social distribution of relevant 
knowledge, COD, TEA, and SDK, will have a negative impact on each of the three 
relative probabilities in equation (1) (See Table 1). 
2.5 Hypotheses 
Based on the above review we have the hypotheses summarized in the upper section of 
Table 1, with reference to which we note the following.  
First, in this study, the default hypotheses are developed in accordance with the µhybrid¶
view of alliances mentioned above, which implies that if a higher value of an 
explanatory variable favours the choice of in-house over outsourcing, it also favours 
the choice of in-house over alliance and the choice of alliance over outsourcing. It 
should be also noted that in this µhybrid¶ view, equity-based alliances are generally 
regarded as being more hierarchical than contract-based alliances along the market-
hierarchy continuum (Oxley, 1997). Hypotheses regarding the choice of any specific 
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pair of organization modes can be inferred accordingly. In particular, given the focus 
of the paper, the following (default) hypotheses are highlighted. 
Hypotheses A1/A2/A3: The more complex (in terms of intensity of relevant knowledge 
sets interactions) (A1), the more non-decomposable (A2), the more ill-structured (A3) 
a technological problem is, the more likely that internal organization will be chosen by 
the firm to organize the technological problem solving over alliance and outsourcing, 
ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis B: The higher the level of WKHILUP¶Vexisting knowledge base in relevant 
fields, the more likely that internal organization will be chosen by the firm to organize 
the technological problem solving over alliance and outsourcing, ceteris paribus. 
Second, the view that alliances are µK\EULG¶ modes of organization has long been 
questioned (Atik, 1995; Meanrd, 2012). Oxley, who extended the µhybrid¶ view by 
constructing the above mentioned market-hierarchy ordering of various alliance forms, 
observed subsequently that DOWKRXJK KHU FDWHJRUL]DWLRQ ZDV ³D XVHIXO FRQWULEXWLRQ´ 
³DWWHPSWV to order the numerous alliance forms on a single continuum were futile 
because of conceptual as well as practical barriers´ Oxley, 2012: p. 148-149). 
Moreover, as argued by Kay (1997), a joint venture, presumably the most important 
µK\EULG¶ PRGH, is typically plagued by the problem of being the servant of several 
masters, with the implied contractual, control, and appropriability problems all tending 
to exacerbate transaction costs relative to a pure hierarchy. Much of the managerial 
literature also suggests that a joint venture is often viewed by managers as the most 
expensive mode of organization, a last resort dominated by other modes (Brechbuhl, 
2006). In this perspective, it is problematic to treat alliances (in particular, joint ventures) 
DV µhybrid¶. Rather, they should be viewed as independent modes of organization. 
Although such expensive modes are generally avoided, alliances do offer some unique 
benefits, in particular access to external complementary knowledge in the face of 
solving a non-decomposable, complex problem that is beyond the firm¶s existing 
capabilities/knowledge base. It can therefore be argued that the likelihood of 
knowledge/capabilities bottlenecks increases with problem complexity, and that such 
bottlenecks might be expected to lead the firm to referring to external sources for 
complementary knowledge, most possibly by forming alliances with other firms 
(Coombs and Metcalfe, 2000). In the context of choosing between in-house and alliance, 
it is reasonable to argue that the more complex the problem the less likely it can be 
solved internally, for lack of complete knowledge, and therefore the more likely the 
problem solving will be organized by alliance. More explicitly we have 
Hypothesis A1·: The more complex (in terms of intensity of relevant knowledge set 
interactions) a technological problem is, the more likely that alliance will be chosen by 
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the firm to organize the technological problem solving over internal organization, 
ceteris paribus. 
The implications are noted as alternative hypotheses in the second row of Table 1. In 
our view, these alterative hypotheses are consistent with the logics of the PSP and the 
KBV, although at odds with the µK\EULG¶YLHZRI alliances.  
Given space constraints and the focus of the article, we do not review relevant TCE 
literature. For the few TCE variables included in this study, we adopt rather standard 
hypotheses as found in some highly cited TCE literature (Oxley, 1997; Robertson and 
Gatignon, 1998; Williamson, 1985). More explicitly, we hypothesize that the higher the 
demand uncertainty, that the more specific the relevant human/physical asset is, and 
that the more appropriable the relevant knowledge is, the less likely that equity-based 
alliance, contracted-based alliance, or outsourcing will be chosen over in-house to 
organize problem-solving. See the lower section of Table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
3. Empirical Setting 
3.1  Data Collection 
Data were collected by survey administered by structured interview. Some of the 
questions are adapted from previous studies (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1993) whilst others 
are originally constructed to capture information on certain underexplored variables, in 
particular the PSP variables. Obtaining responses from executives is often problematic 
with a survey, and the response rates for R&D related surveys are typically low 
(Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010). Given this, a consultancy company with connections to 
the targeted industry was contracted to help distribute the questionnaire designed by the 
authors and to conduct part of the interviews. 
In the survey, three types of information were collected. First, respondents were asked 
to give examples, based on provided definitions, of the organization modes of their 
R&D projects involving an international element3. Second, respondents were asked to 
evaluate, again based on provided definitions, various attributes of the R&D projects 
using pre-defined five point Likert scales, focussing on the central PSP, and other 
control, variables. Third, additional background information regarding the reported 
R&D project and the firm, e.g. firm size and origin, was also collected. 
                                                 
3
 An international R&D project is defined as one that involves cooperation with a foreign 
partner, is undertaken in a foreign location, or is intended mainly to serve a foreign market. 
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To control for inter-industry differences, the sectoral coverage of the study was 
confined to the consumer electronics industry, which includes (a) PC and peripherals, 
(b) mobile handset and other personal communication devices, and (c) household 
appliances and audio/video equipment. 
The target response group of the survey was corporate informants with knowledge of 
WKHLUFRPSDQ\¶Vproject-level R&D activities, including R&D directors, R&D project 
managers, senior R&D researchers, etc.  
The survey followed a rather standard procedure. The consultancy company compiled 
from their database a list of consumer electronics companies that might have 
participated in international R&D4. Companies on the list were randomly selected, with 
a senior manager in the selected company then being contacted by telephone to enquire 
into the possibility of survey participation. If rejected, the surveyors moved on to the 
next company on the list until the pre-set sample size 5  was reached. In total 96 
companies were contacted, with 50 agreeing to participate in the survey.   
For these 50 companies structured interviews based on the pre-designed questionnaire 
were then arranged. The interviews were conducted through on-site visits by trained 
surveyors in 2010, usually lasting 1±2 hours. Follow-up contact with 50% of the 
interviewees was subsequently made by a supervisor to double-check the procedure and 
results. In the interview, each respondent was encouraged to report a diversified 
selection of their company¶s international R&D projects. However, given the time-
consuming and attention-demanding nature of the questionnaire, and that a single 
informant is more likely to over- or under-report certain phenomena (Phillips, 1981), 
the maximum number of projects reported by a single respondent was restricted to 3.  
Overall, 111 people from these 50 companies were interviewed, providing detailed 
information on 142 international R&D projects. 
3.2 General Industrial Background 
In the past two GHFDGHV &KLQD¶V manufacturing sector in general, and consumer 
electronics industry in particular, has witnessed the rapid globalization of innovation 
activities, with a large proportion of R&D activities in this industry being attributable 
                                                 
4
 Given that small companies are less active in R&D (Acs and Audretsch, 1991), an annual 
turnover of $2 million was (arbitrarily) set as the threshold for choosing candidate companies. 
We experimented with different thresholds by appropriate re-estimation and find the substance 
of our conclusions is unchanged.  
5
 Given the number of covariates we are particularly interested in (the few PSP variables and 
EKB) as well as the number of other control variables (Hosmer et al., 2013),  the need for a 
reasonable number of projects organized in the considered modes, and our budget constraint, 
the minimum sample size was set at 140 R&D projects. 
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to multinational R&D presence in China (Boutellier et al., 2008; Rowen et al., 2008), 
either independently or in cooperation with indigenous firms (Li and Yue, 2005). Over 
the period, almost all major global players have become entrenched in this less 
regulated and highly competitive industry (McKinsey, 2003), making it of considerable 
interest for examining the determinants of the organization choice for R&D, given the 
diversity of the complexity of technological problems to be solved and of  the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶NQRZOHGJHHQGRZPHQWV.  
There is little systematic information regarding the overall status of international R&D 
activities in the Chinese consumer electronics industry. Nevertheless, the following 
information revealed by previous studies can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the 
representativeness of our sample. Prior studies (e.g., Zhou et al., 2010) indicate that 
manufacturing activities in this industry are highly concentrated in the following three 
regions: the Pearl River Delta (centered around Shenzhen and Dongguan), and, to a 
lesser extent, the Yangtze River Delta (centered around Shanghai and Suzhou), and the 
Bohai-Rim (centered around Beijing and Tianjin). The location of R&D activities in 
this industry is somewhat different as studies suggest that foreign R&D facilities in 
China are predominantly concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai6, with Tianjin, Suzhou 
and the Cantonese cities of Guangzhou and Shenzhen as secondary locations (Boutellier 
et al., 2008). 
Given this background information, we believe the current sample is representative of 
the population in terms of geographic and sectoral distribution, type of ownership, etc. 
(see Table 2). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
3.3 The Variables: Definition and Measurement 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, organization mode, is an unordered discrete variable classified 
into three broad categories: in-house, collaborative arrangements (alliances) and 
RXWVRXUFLQJ DUP¶V-length like contract) (Robertson and Gatignon, 1998). With 
contract-based and equity-based collaborative arrangements treated separately (Pisano, 
1989), a total of four organization modes results, namely. 
In-house ² the firm undertakes the R&D project internally. 
                                                 
6
 According to Boutellier et al. (2008), by September 2006, 67% of the 495 foreign R&D 
laboratories in China were located in Beijing and Shanghai. 
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Outsourcing ² the firm contracts out an R&D project to some other organization to 
find a solution for a technological problem. 
Collaborative arrangements (alliances) ²which DOORZVIRUDZLGHYDULHW\RIµK\EULG¶
organization modes. In this study, contract-based and equity-based collaborative 
arrangements are distinguished. In the first case no equity exchange is involved, 
whereas in the second case partner firms refer to some equity-based arrangement as an 
umbrella structure to support their joint R&D projects, either setting up a joint venture 
and undertaking joint R&D projects in this new legal entity, or alternatively 
taking/cross-taking minority equity stakes to support such projects.  
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
All independent variables, unless stated otherwise, are measured using a five point 
Likert scale. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for these variables and Table 4 
presents correlations. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
Complexity (intensity of knowledge-set interactions) and decomposability are treated 
as separate variables. Along with problem structure, these three variables are defined 
in the same manner as in sub-sections 2.1 & 2.2.  
Complexity (Intensity of Knowledge Set Interactions) (COM) measures the number of 
relevant knowledge sets and the intensity of their interactions for the technological 
problem under consideration. 
Decomposability (DEC) measures the extent to which the technological problem under 
consideration can be divided into sub-problems. 
Problem Structure (PS) measures the extent to which the technological problem under 
consideration is well structured.  
Existing Knowledge-Base (EKB) for a given R&D project is defined as the extent to 
which a firm possesses all the relevant knowledge/capabilities required to solve the 
problem at the time of project initiation. 
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The questionnaire items relating to these four variables are  presented in Appendix I 7. 
Given the focus of the paper, we treat the following few KBV and TCE variables as 
control variables in our analysis. Following some highly cited literature, these variables 
are defined as follow. 
Knowledge Tacitness is operationalized by the two dimensions of codifiability (COD) 
and teachability (TEA) (Zander and Kogut, 1995). Codifiability is defined as the extent 
to which it is easy to find/prepare relevant reference materials (e.g., books, manuals) in 
order to provide a new team member with most of the critical knowledge. Teachability 
is defined as the extent to which it is easy for a new team member to learn, by working 
with, and being mentored by, a skilled team member, the core knowledge and skills 
required to solve the problem.  
Social Distribution of Knowledge (SDK) is defined as the extent to which the 
knowledge required to solve the problem under consideration is possessed by one or a 
few individual experts, as opposed to being widely distributed amongst a group of 
experts, so that no single expert can solve the problem. 
Demand Uncertainty (DU) is defined as the difficulty of forecasting the future demand 
for the product/service to which the R&D project under consideration is intended to 
contribute (Robertson and Gatignon, 1998).  
Human Asset Specificity (HAS) is defined as the extent to which the skills and 
knowledge developed/accumulated in the R&D project under consideration are useful 
outside the project. Physical asset specificity (PAS) is defined as the extent to which 
the investment in physical assets to support the R&D project under consideration can 
be redeployed outside the project (Williamson, 1985). 
Appropriability of the relevant knowledge is defined as (AP1) the extent to which the 
R&D project under consideration can be easily imitated by an outsider (e.g., by reverse 
engineering or inventing around), and (AP2) the extent to which the departure of one 
or a few key R&D team members to a competitor would lead to substantial leakages of 
relevant knowledge to that competitor  (Oxley, 1997).  
In addition to the above variables we include firm size and firm origin in our analysis 
as basic firm controls. 
                                                 
7
 Given space constraints the appendix does not contain the complete questionnaire. However 
it is available on request. 
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Firm size (SZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of the ILUP¶VUHYHQXH (in millions 
of US dollars) in the year when the project was started. 
Firm Origin (FOR) is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is a foreign (non-
Chinese) firm, and zero otherwise. 
4. Multinomial Analysis of Organization Choice 
We assume that the probability of project i being organized by mode j is given 
by  
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where ix  is a vector of characteristics of the ith R&D project and the jE  are unknown 
parameter vectors to be estimated. The final expression in (2) defines the multinomial 
logit model. Parameter estimation is typically, and is here, maximum likelihood 
estimation with the first vector 1E  set at zero to ensure identification. Given 1E  = 0 we 
have 
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so that an increase in ikx  increases (decreases) 1/ij iP P , the likelihood of mode j relative 
to mode 1, when jkE  is positive (negative). A zero jkE  implies that 1/ij iP P does not 
change as ikx  changes although the individual Pij  and Pi1 will change, as noted by 
Hoetker (2007), and as reflected in the calculation of absolute, rather than relative, 
probabilities in section 4.2. Further a zero jkE does not remove ikx from the model. 
Removal of ikx  from the model requires jkE being zero for j = 2« , a total of 3 
restrictions if there are 4 alternatives, as here. The derivative in (4) leads to an 
interpretation of jkE  as the proportionate increase in 1/ij iP P  when ikx  increases by one 
unit. A related interpretation is based on  
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and so on exp( )jkE  as the implied multiplication when ikx  increases by one unit. The 
implied proportionate change in 1/ij iP P  is then exp( ) 1jkE  . The value of exp( )jkE  is 
reported as RRR (relative risk ratio) in Table 4. (RRR-1)100 then gives the percentage 
change in 1/ij iP P implied by a unit change in ikx . 
4.1 Multinomial Logit Estimation Results 
Using the 142 sample observations, we estimate a multinomial logit model (Model 1) 
explaining the choice between in-house, equity-based alliance, contract-based alliance, 
and outsourcing, with all independent variables included, and with in-house being the 
base alternative. The left section of Table 5 presents the results. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
Equity-based alliance 
For this alternative eight variables are significant at the 10% level or better, four (EKB, 
COM, DEC and COD) being PSP/KBV variables and two (HAS, AP2) being TCE 
variables.  
The coefficient of EKB is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that when 
a firm has increasingly more complete relevant knowledge it is more likely that problem 
solving will be organized in-house rather than by alliance.  
The coefficients of COM and DEC are both significant at the 1% level, but with 
different signs. The positive (negative) COM (DEC) coefficient suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, equity-based alliance is increasingly preferred to in-house as problem 
complexity increases, whilst in-house is increasingly preferred to equity-based alliance 
as problem non-decomposability increases.  
The coefficients of COD and HAS are negative, suggesting that the more non-codifiable 
the relevant knowledge is, and the more specific the skills and knowledge developed in 
the R&D are, the more likely that in-house will be chosen over equity-based alliance. 
The positive coefficient of AP2 implies that a higher appropriability of relevant 
knowledge increases the relative probability of choosing equity-based alliance over in-
house. This result is at odds with the prediction of TCE (Oxley, 1997), as internal 
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organization is generally believed to be the most efficient mode for overcoming the 
appropriability problem. Notice that AP2 is also significant, but with a negative 
coefficient, in the estimation results relating to contract-based alliance.  
The coefficients of the firm control variables are both significant at the 1% level. The 
positive (negative) coefficient of SZE (FOR) implies that the larger the firm size the 
more likely that equity-based alliance will be chosen over in-house, and that a foreign 
firm is less likely than a Chinese firm to choose equity-based alliance over in-house, 
ceteris paribus.  
Contract-based Alliance 
For this alternative five variables are significant at the 10% level or better, two (EKB, 
SDK) being PSP/KBV variables and one (AP2) being a TCE variable.  
SDK is significant at the 10% level for contract-based alliance but is not significant for 
equity-based alliance. The RRR values indicate that a unit increase in SDK reduces the 
relative probability of choosing contract-based alliance and equity-based alliance (over 
in-house) by 46% and 5.3% respectively. Therefore, when an R&D project involves 
highly socially distributed knowledge, alliance in general, and contract-based alliance 
in particular, is less likely to be chosen over in-house. COM is not significant for 
contract-based alliance but is, at the 1% level, for equity-based alliance. The RRR 
values indicate that a unit increase in COM increases the relative probability of 
choosing contract-based and equity-based alliance over in-house by 199.9% and 940.5% 
respectively. Thus the effect of COM on contract-based alliance is both smaller and less 
significant than that on equity-based alliance, suggesting that the more complex the 
problem is the more likely that alliance will be chosen over in-house, with a preference 
for equity-based alliance rather than contract-based alliance. Given that, unlike equity-
based alliances, contract-based alliances do not generally have access to such 
governance apparatus as high bandwidth communication channels, collocation of team 
members, and centralized administrative coordination, and that equity-based alliances 
are supported by enhanced incentive alignment associated with shared equity, it is 
reasonable to argue that of the two types of alliance, contract-based alliance is 
particularly unsuitable for mobilizing socially distributed knowledge, and that equity-
based alliance is far more effective in dealing with a more complex problem. 
The coefficient of AP2 is negative and significant at the 1% level. As noted earlier, its 
sign is opposite to that for equity-based alliance, suggesting that the two types of 
alliance differ markedly in terms of ability to cope with appropriability problems. The 
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results might be partially 8  justified on two grounds, both pointing to a greater 
effectiveness of an equity-based alliance in dealing with appropriability problems. First, 
equity-based alliances are supported by shared ownership, helping to moderate 
opportunistic inclinations of participating parties. Second, the administrative structure 
that comes with shared ownership also furnishes an equity-based alliance with 
enhanced administrative controls over unintended leakage of appropriable knowledge. 
The coefficients of the firm control variables are again significant, with the same signs 
as for the alternative of equity-based alliance, suggesting that changes in firm size and 
firm origin have similar effects on both types of alliance. 
Outsourcing 
For this alternative four variables are significant at the 10% level or better, one (EKB) 
being a PSP/KBV variable and two (PAS, AP2) being TCE variables. Seemingly, 
transaction cost considerations play a more decisive role for the choice of outsourcing 
than for the other alternatives. 
The coefficient of EKB is again negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that a higher level of existing knowledge base favours the choice of in-house over 
outsourcing. The negative coefficients of PAS and AP2 suggest that as the physical 
assets invested to support an R&D project become more specific, and that as the 
relevant knowledge becomes more appropriable, it is more likely that the project will 
be organized internally rather than by outsourcing.  
In summary the model performs fairly well, with the RYHUDOOµhit rate¶ of 73.2% being 
considerably higher than that of random prediction, 25%, and that implied by assigning 
all observations to the most common alternative, 43.96%. However, the poor µKLWUDWH¶
of 37.5% for the alternative of equity-based alliance should be noted9.  
Intuition suggests that the two types of alliance should not be combined given that the 
coefficients of AP2 are of different signs, and that a higher COM value favours the 
choice of both types of alliances over in-house, but with the increased probability going 
mostly to equity-based alliance. A more formal approach is to test for the equality of 
all elements of vectors ȕi and ȕj, excepting the constant, to determine whether categories 
i and j can be combined. Thus fourteen restrictions are required if the two types of 
alliances are to be combined. Two test statistics are readily available to test these 
                                                 
8
 The positive AP2 coefficient for equity-based alliance is, however, inconsistent with theory 
and difficult to rationalise. 
9 
  The hit rates for the alternatives of in-house, contract-based alliance and outsourcing are 
86.9%, 73.5% and 73.9% respectively. 
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UHVWULFWLRQV$OLNHOLKRRGUDWLRWHVWȤ2(14) = 21.23, has a p value of 0.096, and a Wald 
VWDWLVWLFȤ2(14) = 33.29, has a p value of 0.003, implying the null can be rejected at the 
10% and 1% significance levels respectively. On balance. the evidence is against the 
combining of the two types of alliance. 
Although deleting variables is not generally encouraged (Hausman & McFadden, 1984; 
Jeremy & Long, 2001), given the small sample size of the study (Hosmer et al., 2013; 
Vittinghoff and McCulloch, 2007) it seems worth considering some simplification. 
Here we consider removing a variable from the model if the statistic for the null of three 
zero coefficients for the variable has a p value above 0.20. The variables PS, COD, 
TEA, SDK, DU, HAS and AP1 are identified by this procedure, with a statistic for their 
joint removal (21 zero coefficients) being Ȥ2(21) = 8.55. The  p value of  0.286 implies 
that the restrictions cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels. Removal of 
these variables leads to the estimation results in the right hand section of Table 5 (Model 
2). Note that the µKLWUDWH¶10 is almost as good as that of Model 1 and that the effects of 
the remaining variables are structurally similar to those of Model 1 in that, with few 
exceptions11,  significance levels are rather stable. In other words, the results concerning 
the few surviving variables seem to be robust across the two specifications. 
4.2 Predicted Probabilities and Marginal effects 
The above discussion considers probabilities relative to the base alternative of in-house 
so that is not clear how the absolute probabilities of the four alternatives are affected 
by the change of variables. However, it is a straightforward exercise to calculate the 
predicted probabilities for each alternative at different values of the explanatory 
variables, as in Figure 2. For example, sub-figures 2-1-1 and 2-1-2 show how the four 
probabilities change as COM varies from one to five in Model 1 and Model 2 
respectively, with the other variables at their sample means. The other sub-figures are 
similarly constructed12. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
Both sub-figure 2-1-1 and 2-1-2 suggest that the probability of equity-based alliance is 
more sensitive to variation in COM than is the probability of contract-based alliance, 
with the first probability being substantially larger when COM equals five. Outsourcing 
                                                 
10
 7KHRYHUDOOµKLWUDWH¶RIPRGHOLV but for the alternative of equity-based alliance, the 
µKLWUDWH¶IXUWKHUUHGXFHVWRThe hit rates for the alternatives of in-house, contract-based 
alliance and outsourcing are 88.5%, 70.6% and 69.6% respectively. 
11
 0RVWQRWDEO\&20¶VFRHIILFLHQWIor the alternative of contract-EDVHGDOOLDQFHDQG'(&¶V
coefficient for the alternative of outsourcing are significant in Model 2, both with the 
anticipated sign, whilst AP2 is no longer significant for the alternative of equity-based alliance. 
12
 The variables included are the variables in Model 2 aside from the two firm controls. 
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or in-house are more likely to be chosen for solving problems of lowest complexity and 
equity-based alliance is most likely for solving the most complex problems. For 
problem of intermediate complexity, internal organization is the first choice. 
In sub-figures 2-2-1 and 2-2-2 the probability of in-house increases substantially with 
DEC, while the probability of equity-based alliance tends to decrease. DEC seems to 
have little effect on the probabilities of contract-based alliance and outsourcing.  
Sub-figures 2-3-1 and 2-3-2 suggest that the two types of alliance are similarly affected 
by variation in EKB, with an initially increasing, and finally decreasing probability. 
Outsourcing and in-house are the most likely alternatives at low and high EKB 
respectively. For intermediate values of EKB contract-based alliance is just the most 
likely. Therefore, when a firm is confronted with a problem for which it has little 
background knowledge, outsourcing is most likely to be chosen as the organization 
mode, whereas with a high level of background knowledge, problem solving is most 
likely to be organised internally.  
Sub-figures 2-4-1 and 2-4-2 show that increasing PAS tends to increase the probability 
of in-house and decrease the probabilities of contract-based alliance and outsourcing. 
However, the two models differ regarding the probability of equity-based alliance, in 
that the probability increases substantially with PAS in Model 1 but is not at all sensitive 
to PAS in Model 2. 
Sub-figures 2-5-1 and Figure 2-5-2 suggest that increasing AP2 tends to increase the 
probabilities of in-house and equity-based alliance and decrease the probabilities of 
contract-based alliance and outsourcing. The results support generally the view that in-
house and equity-based alliance are more effective in coping with the appropriability 
problem than contract-based alliance or outsourcing (Oxley, 1997). However, in both 
sub-figures, equity-based alliance is more likely than in-house when AP2 equals five. 
This result is at odds with the predictions of TCE theory, wherein hierarchy is viewed 
as the most effective mode for dealing with the appropriability problem. 
4.3 Testing the IIA Assumption 
One frequently noted feature of the multinomial logit is the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) property, wherein probability ratios ij ikP P  are unchanged when 
alternatives are added or removed. If IIA were thought inappropriate on theoretical 
grounds then a different specification to the multinomial logit would be needed. One 
such specification is the multinomial probit, although estimation of the multinomial 
 24 
probit is very complicated for all but small J13. In fact the statistic proposed by Hausman 
and McFadden (1984) is frequently presented as a test of the IIA property after 
multinomial logit estimation. It is based on a comparison of the initial multinomial logit 
estimates with the estimates obtained when alternatives are removed and estimation is 
repeated. We conduct the test for both Models 1 and 2, with values judged by reference 
to the 2F (30)  ( 2F (16))  distribution in Model 1 (2) since only 30 (16) of the full set 
of 45 (24) parameters are re-estimated when an alternative is removed. For both models, 
none of the statistics leads to rejection of IIA. This conclusion takes negative calculated 
values to not indicate evidence against IIA, this seemingly being standard practice in 
the literature 14.  The related suest Hausman statistic which is guaranteed to be positive 
(Long and Freese, 2014), is available in STATA, and leads to the same conclusion 
regarding IIA. 
4.4 Discussion 
Complexity, Decomposability and Problem structure 
The empirical results suggest that problem complexity and decomposability are 
important factors shaping a firm¶s R&D organization choice, while the effects of 
problem structure are less evident.  
For equity-based alliances, and for outsourcing in model 2, DEC has a significantly 
negative coefficient, suggesting that non-decomposable problems are more likely to be 
solved in-house than by equity-based alliance because, as we understand it, such 
problems are more effectively managed through the extensive knowledge exchange 
characteristic of internal organization. By contrast, the coefficient of COM is significant, 
and positive, for equity-based alliance (and for contract-based alliance in model 2), 
                                                 
13
 Both multinomial logit and probit are additive random utility models wherein utility 
ijU  = 
ij ijV H , with ijV  ( ijH ) being the deterministic (random) component of utility, and with the j which 
lead to a maximum of the 
ijU  being selected by agent i. Multinomial logit and probit differ in 
the assumptions made about the distribution of 
ijH across i and j. As a practical matter it does 
not seem possible to implement the multinomial probit with no alternative-specific variables, 
as here, in STATA (StataCorp, 2013), which we take to be the `industry standarG¶ 
14
 A 2F statistic ought not to be negative. Hausman and McFadden (1984: p. 1226) suggest there 
are grounds to take a negative value as supportive of IIA. Most of the literature clearly 
subscribes to this view (Cheng & Long, 2007: p. 589), perhaps because the Hausman and 
McFadden suggestion is clearly convenient. Vijverberg (2011) has recently proposed the use 
of an alternative statistic, also considered by Hausman and McFadden (1984), that is guaranteed 
to be positive. However this alternative statistic requires separate programming.  
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suggesting, rather counterintuitively given general PSP arguments, that more complex 
problems are more likely to be solved by equity-based alliance than in-house. 
Overall, the results are mixed. On the one hand, there is support for the PSP argument  
that in-house is most effective for solving non-decomposable problems (Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2004), and that the more hierarchical equity-based alliance is more likely to be 
chosen over contract-based alliance when problem complexity is high (Heiman and 
Nickerson 2004). On the other hand, the results reveal that &20DQG'(&¶s effects on 
the probability of choosing equity-based alliance are in opposite directions, 
contradicting the PSP view that they are two concomitant properties of the same factor 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Relatedly, it is also suggested that, contrary to the 
general PSP prediction, equity-based alliance is even more likely to be chosen over in-
house to solve a more complex problem.  
A Firm¶s Existing Knowledge Base 
The empirical results also suggest that a ILUP¶VH[LVWLQJNQRZOHGJH-base is one of the 
most important single explanatory variables. When a firm is confronted with a problem 
for which it has much (little) relevant knowledge it tends to organize the problem 
solving in-house (by outsourcing). Between these two extremes alliances are most 
likely to be chosen, with the contract-based alliance being the more preferred. These 
findings are generally in line with the KBV and with the bulk of empirical evidence in 
the KBV literature (e.g., Argyres, 1996; Bigelow and Argyres, 2008; Madhok, 2002; 
Poppo and Zenger, 1998), which clearly indicates WKDWDILUP¶VH[LVWLQJNQRZOHGJHEDVH
has a strong independent effect on its organization choice. 
Knowledge Tacitness and Social Distribution 
In contrast to most existing relevant studies (e.g., Heiman and Nickerson., 2004; Kogut 
and Zander, 1993; Mowery et al., 1996) the estimation results lend only weak support 
for the significance of knowledge tacitness, with higher tacitness  (as measured by non-
codifiabiity, COD) favouring the choice of in-house over equity-based alliance in 
Model 1. Similarly, social distribution (embeddedness) of knowledge is only weakly 
significant for the choice between in-house and contract-based alliance in Model 1, 
where, broadly in line ZLWKWKHµUHFHLYHGZLVGRP¶ of relevant theoretical (Langlois and 
Foss, 1999) and empirical (e.g., Heiman and Nickerson, 2004)  work, the more socially 
distributed the knowledge is the more likely in-house is to be chosen as the organization 
mode. Finally, the limitations of the measures of knowledge tacitness employed here 
should be noted, since both codifiability and teachability are rather indirect measures 
of the learning/knowledge transfer which is the essence of knowledge tacitness. 
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TCE Variables 
In both models 1 and 2 PAS is significant, at at least the 10% level, for the choice 
between in-house and outsourcing, and AP2 is also significant, at at least the 5% level, 
for the choice between in-house and contract-based alliance, and the choice between 
in-house and outsourcing. However the positive AP2 coefficient for the alternative of 
equity-based alliance in model 1 is at odds with theoretical prediction. Moreover, as 
concerns over appropriability are known to be related to the institutional environment, 
for which China is not known to be particularly strong, the generality of the results 
regarding appropriability should be cautioned. 
In summary it seems fair to conclude that each theoretical perspective receives some 
support from our results but that PSP/KBV variables such as EKB, COM and DEC 
appear to be the most important in this particular sample. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the PSP of the boundary determination of the firm, both 
theoretically and empirically. On the basis of a review of existing PSP literature it is 
argued that intensity of knowledge set interactions and decomposability are 
conceptually distinguishable and should be treated as separate variables. With reference 
to other closely related literature, it is also argued that a firm¶s existing knowledge can 
be expected to be important in the organization of its problem solving activities, 
notwithstanding that  this dimension has been relatively underexplored in the existing 
PSP literature.  
In the empirical setting of the Chinese consumer electronics industry we examine the 
determinants of a firm¶s organisation choice for its R&D (technological problem 
solving) activities. Existing knowledge base is found to be a strongly significant 
explanatory variable. Problem complexity and decomposability are also found to be 
important, with their effects not always being in the same direction. Non-
decomposability tends to favour the choice of in-house while complexity tends to 
favour the choice of equity-based alliance. These results seemingly support the 
argument that complexity and decomposability should be treated as separate variables. 
They also suggest that, as far as the competencies of governing different types of 
problem solving are concerned, alliances are probably not the mediocre µK\EULG¶ modes 
of organization as they seem to be reserved for the most complex problems.  
With the advantage of hindsight, we see much consistency between these results and 
the basic logics of the KBV and the PSP, although the results regarding problem 
complexity are partially at odds with the predictions of existing PSP literature 
 27 
(Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). In fact, in the KBV and the PSP, the respective effects 
of existing knowledge base and problem complexity on the organization choice are two 
sides of the same coin. Given problem complexity, it is predicted that the larger the 
firm¶s existing knowledge base the more likely problem solving will be organized 
internally. Similarly, it seems equally valid to argue that, given a firm¶s existing 
knowledge base, the more complex the problem is the more knowledge sets will be 
involved and the more likely the firm will be lacking in some critical knowledge 
component (Coombs and Metcalfe, 2000; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). In the face 
of choosing between in-house and alliance, it is therefore reasonable to argue that higher 
problem complexity tends to favour the choice of alliance rather than in-house, as an 
alliance enables a firm to go beyond its existing knowledge base and to access often 
tacit and socially embedded external complementary knowledge, thus making it better 
able to cope with a more complex problem in a limited time span. It should nevertheless 
be noted that the study is limited in that, although we estimate the relationship between 
RUJDQL]DWLRQFKRLFHVDQGFRQWH[WXDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVHJDILUP¶VH[LVWLQJNQRZOHGJH
bases and complexity of the problem to be solved), we are not able to estimate directly 
whether alliance is more efficient in accessing/creating new knowledge, or more 
generally, whether deviation from predicted choice leads to poorer performance, thus 
making the performance implications of organizational choices drawn from our 
analysis less convincing. 
Finally, whilst some TCE variables are found to be significant for certain organization 
choices, the results are relatively more supportive of the PSP and the KBV than of TCE. 
Given that the study concerns the determinants of the ILUPV¶5	'RUJDQL]DWLRQFKRLFH
the generality of this conclusion should be cautioned. 
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Figure 1: The Interaction Matrices of Three NK Systems (N=6, K=1)  
with Different Patterns of Decomposability 
 
The x value on row i and column j stands for the extent to which the function of 
element i is influenced by a change of element j. 
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Table 1: Direction of Change in Probability Ratios in Response to Increases in Variables 
 
ư
 The multinomial logit model is discussed in section 4. The hypotheses here are 
expressed in terms of the direction of change of the probability ratios in equation (1) 
in response to increases in variables. In the multinomial logit model, this is the same 
as the sign of ȕ2k (equity-based alliance), ȕ3k (contract-based alliance), and ȕ4k 
(outsourcing) (see equation (4)), where the k subscript corresponds to the explanatory 
variable under consideration. The µhybrid¶ view of alliance also dictates that 
ȕ2k!ȕ3k!ȕ4k. 
*
 Alternative hypothesis.  
A [] indicates that the hypothesis receives support from both model 1 and 2 estimated 
below. 
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Table 2: Distribution of the Sample by Sector, Location,  
Nature of Ownership and Organization Mode 
 
 
Á +RQJ.RQJ¶s investmHQWLQ0DLQODQG&KLQDLVWUHDWHGDVµIRUHLJQ¶LQYHVWPHQWwhich enjoys 
various benefits. To take advantage of these benefits some Chinese capital often routes itself 
via Hong Kong. Such a practice is NQRZQDV³URund-WULSSLQJ´:HL7KHIHZsupposedly 
Hong Kong firms in our sample are in fact round-tripping domestic private firms, with 
headquarters in Mainland China and a presence in Hong Kong typically restricted  to a single 
small office. 
BY SECTOR BY NATURE OF OWNERSHIP 
Sector Number of 
Cases 
% 
Ownership of the Firm 
being interviewed 
Number of 
Cases 
% 
PC and Peripherals 32 23 Chinese & Hong KongÁ 47 33 
Mobile Handset and Other 
Communication Devices 50 35 
Fully owned Subsidiary of a 
Foreign Firm 78 55 
White Goods and Brown Goods 60 42 Sino-foreign Joint Venture 17 12 
By Location   By Organization Mode   
Location of the R&D Project Number of 
Cases 
% Organization Mode 
Number of 
Cases 
% 
Beijing-Tianjin (Bolai Rim) 21 15 In-house 61 43 
Shanghai-Suzhou(Yangtze River 
Delta) 88 62 Equity-based Alliance 24 17 
South China (Guangdong & 
Fujian) 27 19 Contract-based Alliance 34 24 
Other Locations 6 4 Outsourcing 23 16 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
 
 
 FULL NAME 
 
 
MEAN 
(S.D.)  
 
MIN MAX Entire 
Samples 
(Num. of  
Obs.=142) 
In-house 
(Num. of  
Obs.=61) 
Equity-
based 
Alliance 
(Num. of  
Obs.=24) 
Contract-
based 
Alliance 
(Num. of  
Obs.=34) 
Outsourcing 
(Num. of  
Obs.=23) 
COM Complexity 3.408 (0.764) 
3.377 
(0.778) 
3.542 
(0.833) 
3.735 
(0.567) 
2.870 
(0.626) 2 5 
DEC Decomposability 2.437 (0.803) 
2.508 
(0.744) 
2.333 
(0.868) 
2.706 
(0.760) 
1.957 
(0.767) 1 5 
PS Problem Structure 2.655 (0.826) 
2.705 
(0.803) 
2.583 
(0.654) 
2.941 
(0.919) 
2.174 
(0.717) 1 4 
EKB Existing Knowledge Base 
3.592 
(0.860) 
4.049 
(0.644) 
3.625 
(0.770) 
3.206 
(0.641) 
2.913 
(1.041) 1 5 
COD Codifiability 2.810 (0.825) 
2.770 
(0.864) 
2.750 
(0.737) 
3.029 
(0.834) 
2.652 
(0.775) 1 5 
TEA Teachability 2.592 (0.773) 
2.574 
(0.741) 
2.500 
(0.590) 
2.824 
(0.797) 
2.391 
(0.941) 1 5 
SDK Social Distribution 
of Knowledge 
3.239 
(1.038) 
3.377 
(0.916) 
3.125 
(1.076) 
2.735 
(0.931) 
3.739 
(1.176) 1 5 
DU Demand Uncertainty 
2.408 
(0.852) 
2.410 
(0.761) 
2.333 
(0.816) 
2.500 
(0.992) 
2.348 
(0.935) 1 5 
HAS Human Asset Specificity 
1.415 
(0.633) 
1.443 
(0.620) 
1.417 
(0.776) 
1.441 
(0.613) 
1.304 
(0.559) 1 4 
PAS Physical Asset Specificity 
1.937 
(0.755) 
2.04 
(0.784) 
1.958 
(0.859) 
1.971 
(0.717) 
1.565 
(0.507) 1 4 
AP1 Appropriability1 3.085 (0.926) 
3.115 
(0.877) 
3.292 
(0.806) 
2.794 
(1.067) 
3.217 
(0.902) 1 5 
AP2 Appropriability2 3.148 (0.663) 
3.262 
(0.705) 
3.458 
(0.588) 
2.853 
(0.558) 
2.957 
(0.562) 2 5 
SZE Firm Size 4.152 (2.422) 
4.515 
(2.628) 
4.435 
(2.127) 
3.569 
(2.155) 
3.757 
(2.433) -2.3 7.09 
FOR Firm Origin 0.634 (0.483) 
0.918 
(0.277) 
0.417 
(0.504) 
0.206 
(0.410) 
0.739 
(0.449) 0 1 
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Table 4: Correlations of Independent Variables 
 
   COM DEC PS EKB COD TEA SDK DU HAS PAS AP1 AP2 SZE FOR 
 Complexity COM 1              
 Decomposability DEC 0.655 1             
 Problem Structure PS 0.472 0.668 1            
 Existing Knowledge Base EKB -0.176 -0.305 -0.200 1           
 Codifiability COD 0.428 0.405 0.299 -0.290 1          
 Teachablity TEA 0.296 0.403 0.455 -0.210 0.378 1         
 Social Distribution of Knowledge SDK -0.205 -0.118 -0.077 -0.009 -0.029 -0.125 1        
 Demand Uncertainty DU 0.156 0.339 0.333 -0.148 0.000 0.083 -0.063 1       
 Human Asset Specificity HAS 0.175 0.101 0.005 -0.116 0.302 0.146 -0.131 0.091 1      
 Physical Asset Specificity PAS 0.291 0.397 0.135 -0.084 0.356 0.186 0.001 0.129 0.352 1     
 Appropriability1 AP1 -0.440 -0.412 -0.425 0.293 -0.230 -0.308 0.053 -0.206 -0.169 -0.185 1    
 Appropriability2 AP2 -0.204 -0.136 -0.101 0.206 -0.143 -0.089 -0.011 -0.032 0.022 -0.109 0.153 1   
 Firm Size SZE -0.055 0.101 0.173 0.153 -0.103 -0.042 0.210 -0.005 -0.043 0.068 0.105 -0.044 1  
 Firm Origin FOR -0.149 -0.060 -0.017 0.286 -0.194 -0.099 0.261 -0.013 -0.079 -0.006 0.085 -0.007 0.457 1 
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Table 5: Multinomial Logit Estimation Results 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 2 (Equity-based Alliance) 3 (Contract-based Alliance) 4 (Outsourcing) 2 (Equity-based Alliance) 3 (Contract-based Alliance) 4 (Outsourcing) 
 
Pred. 
Sign  
Coef. 
(S.E.)  
RRR 
(S.E.) 
Pred. 
Sign  
Coef. 
(S.E.)  
RRR 
(S.E.) 
Pred. 
Sign  
Coef. 
(S.E.)  
RRR 
(S.E.) 
Pred. 
Sign  
Coef. 
(S.E.)  
RRR 
(S.E.) 
Pred. 
Sign  
Coef. 
(S.E.)  
RRR 
(S.E.) 
Pred. 
Sign  
Coef. 
(S.E.)  
RRR 
(S.E.) 
COM 
-(+)Á 2.342 (0.739) 
*** 
 
10.405 
(7.685) -(+)Á 
1.098 
(0.684)  
2.999 
(2.050) - 
-0.555 
(0.682)  
0.574 
(0.392) -(+)Á 
1.432 
(0.590) 
** 
 
4.186 
(2.470) -(+)Á 
0.970 
(0.587) 
* 
 
2.637 
(1.548) - 
-0.679 
(0.593)  
0.507 
(0.301) 
DEC 
- 
-2.080 
(0.790) 
*** 
 
0.125 
(0.099) - 
-1.261 
(0.789)  
0.283 
(0.224) - 
-1.068 
(0.893)  
0.344 
(0.307) - 
-1.873 
(0.625) 
*** 
 
0.154 
(0.096) - 
-0.982 
(0.610)  
0.375 
(0.229) - 
-1.706 
(0.712) 
** 
 
0.182 
(0.129) 
PS 
- 
-0.344 
(0.686) 
 
 
0.709 
(0.486) - 
0.034 
(0.707) 
 
 
1.035 
(0.732) - 
-0.984 
(0.801)  
0.374 
(0.300)             
EKB 
- 
-2.063 
(0.641) 
*** 
 
0.127 
(0.082) - 
-2.312 
(0.648) 
*** 
 
0.099 
(0.064) - 
-2.850 
(0.662) 
*** 
 
0.058 
(0.038) - 
-1.219 
(0.516) 
** 
 
0.295 
(0.152) - 
-1.615 
(0.535) 
*** 
 
0.199 
(0.106) - 
-2.491 
(0.552) 
*** 
 
0.083 
(0.046) 
COD 
- 
-0.984 
(0.549) 
* 
 
0.374 
(0.205) - 
-0.435 
s(0.549)  
0.647 
(0.355) - 
-0.114 
(0.612)  
0.893 
(0.546)             
TEA 
- 
-0.228 
(0.542)  
0.796 
(0.431) - 
0.294 
(0.496)  
1.341 
(0.666) - 
-0.119 
(0.632)  
0.888 
(0.561)             
SDK 
- 
-0.054 
(0.344)  
0.947 
(0.326) - 
-0.616 
(0.369) 
* 
 
0.540 
(0.199) - 
0.233 
(0.417)  
1.263 
(0.527)             
DU 
- 
-0.295 
(0.444)  
1.038 
(0.454) - 
-0.052 
(0.406)  
0.949 
(0.386) - 
0.439 
(0.547)  
1.552 
(0.848)             
HAS 
- 
-0.864 
(0.621) 
* 
 
0.280 
(0.188) - 
-0.649 
(0.663)  
0.522 
(0.346) - 
-0.214 
(0.815)  
0.807 
(0.658)             
PAS 
- 
0.596 
(0.531)  
1.408 
(0.749) - 
-0.548 
(0.524)  
0.578 
(0.303) - 
-1.520 
(0.736) 
** 
 
0.219 
(0.161) - 
-0.308 
(0.420)  
0.735 
(0.308) - 
-0.603 
(0.429)  
0.547 
(0.235) - 
-1.026 
(0.587) 
* 
 
0.358 
(0.211) 
AP1 
- 
0.519 
(0.481)  
1.327 
(0.620) - 
-0.018 
(0.444)  
0.983 
(0.436) - 
0.214 
(0.528)  
1.239 
(0.655)             
AP2 
- 
1.195 
(0.584) 
* 
 
2.744 
(1.612) - 
-1.717 
(0.590) 
*** 
 
0.180 
(0.106) - 
-1.342 
(0.648) 
** 
 
0.261 
(0.169) - 
0.618 
(0.496)  
1.856 
(0.920) - 
-1.454 
(0.544) 
*** 
 
0.234 
(0.127) - 
-1.213 
(0.604) 
** 
 
0.297 
(0.180) 
SZE N/A 0.784 (0.230) 
*** 
 
 N/A 0.534 (0.211) 
** 
 
 N/A 0.065 (0.193)   N/A 
0.649 
(0.194) 
*** 
 
 N/A 0.417 (0.177) 
** 
 
 N/A 0.018 (0.160)   
FOR N/A -5.620 (1.257) 
*** 
 
0.004 
(0.005) N/A 
-5.886 
(1.219) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(0.003) N/A 
-1.914 
(1.154) 
* 
 
0.147 
(0.170) N/A 
-4.459 
(1.030) 
*** 
 
0.012 
(0.012) N/A 
-5.168 
(1.028) 
*** 
 
0.006 
(0.006) N/A 
-1.146 
(1.037)  
0.318 
(0.330) 
CON  5.407 (4.655)    
18.236 
(5.473) 
*** 
 
  
22.430 
(5.577) 
*** 
 
 
 
2.050 
(3.635)    
11.399 
(3.689) 
*** 
 
 
 
20.437 
(4.095) 
*** 
 
 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1; Á alternative hypothesis 
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Figure 2: The Effects of the Point-by-Point Increase of Selected 
Variables on the Predicted Probability of Each Alternative 
 
 
Figure 2-1-1 (Model 1) 
 
 
Figure 2-2-1 (Model 1) 
 
 
Figure 2-3-1 (Model 1) 
 
 
Figure 2-1-2 (Model 2) 
 
 
Figure 2-2-2 (Model 2) 
 
 
Figure 2-3-2 (Model 2) 
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Figure 2-4-1 (Model 1) 
 
 
Figure 2-5-1 (Model 1) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4-2 (Model 2) 
 
 
Figure 2-5-2 (Model 2) 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire Items on Constructs of Problem Structure, Complexity,  
'HFRPSRVDELOLW\DQG$)LUP¶V([LVWLQJ.QRZOHGJH%DVH 
 
